Telecommunications reforms in Portugal and the European Union by Sousa, Helena
  
 
Instituto de Ciências Sociais 
 
Centro de Estudos de Comunicação e Sociedade
http://www.cecs.uminho.pt
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Telecommunications Reforms in Portugal and the European Union∗
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Helena Sousa 
Professora Associada 
 
helena@ics.uminho.pt
 
 
Universidade do Minho 
Centro de Estudos de Comunicação e Sociedade 
Campus de Gualtar 
4710-057 Braga 
Portugal 
 
                                                 
∗SOUSA, H. (1996) “Telecommunications Reforms in Portugal and the European Union” in 
Telecommunications Policy, Vol.20, nº9, PERGAMON 
 
Helena Sousa   Telecommunications Reforms in  
   Portugal and the European Union 
Abstract 
The social democrats, in office from 1985 to 1995, have introduced significant reforms 
in the Portuguese telecommunications sector. The terminal equipment and advanced 
services were liberalised; the separation of the regulatory and operational functions 
became effective; the telecommunications sector underwent a major re-restructuring 
which involved the merger of the three main public telecommunications operators and, 
finally, the main operator, Portugal Telecom, was partly privatised. The EU has 
certainly played a part in the national telecommunications reform but this article argues 
that, although most of the policy decisions adopted in Portugal are in accordance with 
the EU policy framework, it does not necessarily follow that they were imposed by the 
Union and that they were in contradiction with the government's short-time objectives.  
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When Portugal joined the EC in 1986, the Community was still struggling for 
legitimacy to intervene in the most controversial areas of telecommunications policy. 
From the creation of the Task Force on Information Technology within DGIII in 1983 
up until the publication of the 1987 Green Paper, the Task Force had to work extremely 
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hard to develop a coalition of supporters for its future action and to co-ordinate different 
initiatives within the Commission by DGXIII, DGIII, DGIV and DGXII. Despite the 
lack of movement in the opening of markets, in November 1984, the Commission 
managed to gain agreement from the Council to its five-pronged policy proposals 
designed to i) create a community market for telecommunications equipment and 
terminals via standardisation, mutual recognition of type approvals and the opening of 
access to public contracts; ii) improve the development of ISDN; iii) launch a 
development programme of advanced telecommunications services and networks, and 
implement infrastructure projects of common interest (RACE); iv) promote the 
development of advanced services for less favoured regions (STAR) and v) co-ordinate 
negotiating positions with regard to international bodies1. 
Although the Community was short in binding legislation until the publication 
of the 1987 Green Paper, several relevant Council documents were approved along the 
lines of the five-pronged policy proposals mentioned above. Indeed, the actual EC 
intervention in the telecommunications sector - when Portugal joined - revolved around 
industrial policy initiatives and R&D programmes. Programmes such as ESPRIT and 
RACE were showing some results and the development of ISDN was perceived as 
crucial to the competitiveness of the European industry. Wider liberalisation was 
already on the agenda but, because consensus was difficult, not much progress was 
made until the Green Paper was published. 
 
The EU's Legal Framework 
When Portugal became an EC-member state, there was no legal obligation to 
introduce any change in the structure of the Portuguese telecommunications, but the 
national authorities felt under pressure to modernise and to open up the 
telecommunications sector. On the one hand, they wanted to be seen as 'true Europeans' 
                                                 
1Hills, J, and Papathanassopoulos The Democracy Gap Greenwood, London (1991) 
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and, on the other hand, what they understood as the most successful countries (the US, 
UK and Japan) had already introduced changes in their telecommunications markets2. In 
fact, these countries, then run by conservative governments, had already broken-up their 
PTT monopolies and privatised (partly at least) their public operators. 
With the development of a wider Common Market in perspective (the Single 
European Act was signed in 1986), the Commission argued for a common market in 
telecommunications terminal equipment, a common market in telecommunications 
services, and a common market in network equipment, supposedly to ensure the 
Community's future position in large-scale information technology3. The liberalisation 
of equipment and services would also require the separation of regulators and operators. 
The provisions of the network infrastructure and basic services were to remain 
unchallenged, under the control of national PTTs. 
Being a consultation document, the Green Paper required subsequent 
legislation to implement its provisions. During the process of drafting legislation some 
compromises became unavoidable, weakening somewhat the original positions4. A 
number of directives, decisions and recommendations followed. Amongst the most 
relevant binding legislation are the 1988 directive on competition in terminal equipment 
markets5 and the 1990 directive on competition in the telecommunications services 
markets6. The former prevents member states from granting special or exclusive rights 
to a private or public body for the importation, connection or bringing into service of 
terminal equipment; the latter says that member states shall withdraw special or 
                                                 
2The liberalisation drift started in the US in the 1960's culminating with the divestiture of AT&T in 1984. 
In the same year, the British telecommunications operator, BT, was privatised and a duopoly network 
structure was set up. Correspondingly, in Japan, in the very same year, the long distance network was 
liberalised  and the telecommunications operator, NTT, was partially privatised. 
3Commission of the European Communities Green Paper on the Development of the Common Market for 
Telecommunications Services and Equipment (COM (87) 290 final) 30 June 1987, Brussels, CEC 
4Bauer, Johannes, and Charles Steinfield 'Telecommunications Initiatives of the European Communities' 
in Steinfield, Charles et al (eds) Telecommunications in Transition Sage, Thousand Oaks (1994) 
5Commission of the European Communities Commission Directive of 16 May 1988 on Competition in the 
Markets in Telecommunications Terminal Equipment (88/301/EEC; OJ L131/73, 27.05.88) 
6Council of the European Communities Council Directive of 28 June 1990 on Competition in the Markets 
for Telecommunications Services (90/388/EEC; OJ L192/10, 24.07.90) 
CECS      Pág. 4 de 28 
Centro de Estudos de Comunicação e Sociedade      www.cecs.uminho.pt 
Helena Sousa   Telecommunications Reforms in  
   Portugal and the European Union 
exclusive rights for the supply of telecommunications services other than voice 
telephony and shall take the necessary measures to ensure that any operator is entitled to 
supply such telecommunications services. 
The EU has been mainly preoccupied with equipment market liberalisation 
and value-added services such as satellite and mobile communications but, since 1994, 
its activity has intensified around infrastructure liberalisation. The Bangemann Report7 - 
subscribed to by Portugal - argues that infrastructure competition is a crucial stage in 
the development of the EU telecommunications policy. Furthermore, the EU is pushing 
for the introduction of competition in voice telephony. Although the Commission's 
plans to introduce it as soon as 1996 were abandoned, most EU member states have 
now agreed that they would liberalise basic voice services by 1998, being Portugal and 
Greece the exception. Portugal has announced plans to liberalise in 2000 and Greece 
will probably liberalise in 2003. 
Though Portugal was one of the countries which asked for an extension in the 
liberalisation of voice telephony, so far its regulatory reforms have been well in line 
with the EU telecommunications policy framework. But, as senior EU officials 
recognise, the advantages of competition for advanced countries are easier to 
demonstrate: 'there are industrial interests to support, they have a strong local market 
and the associated economies of scale - and they can use these as a springboard for 
expansion into other markets'8. Concentration of manufacturing supply across national 
borders has resulted in Siemens of Germany and Alcatel of France becoming the major 
European manufacturers. With the extension of EU membership, these have now been 
joined by Ericsson of Sweden. World oversupply of equipment, coupled with the 
convergence of computing and telecommunications, and the penetration of the 
                                                 
7Bangemann et al (members of the High-level Group on the Information Society) Europe and the Global 
Information Society: Recommendations to the European Council Brussels (26 may 1994) 
8Berben, Cor, and Clements B 'The European framework for competition in telecommunications, the 
benefits for peripheral countries' Telecommunications Policy 1995 19 (4) pp 276 
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telecommunications sector by computer companies, have resulted in fierce competition 
for exports and the politicisation of such exports9. 
Indeed, it is relatively easy to assess the benefits of EU's telecommunications 
policy for more industrialised countries, but it all becomes rather more complicated if 
one attempts to value the benefits for less favoured regions such as Portugal. Indeed, the 
Commission has put forward little more than general hypotheses. The benefits for LFRs 
are likely to be based on the 'macroeconomic impact of improved services, the 
encouragement of inward investment in the sector, and the participation  of strong and 
efficient local operators in global ventures'. No serious attempt has been made by 
governments and/or by the EU to provide empirical evidence to sustain their claims 
about the benefits of the new regulatory framework for LFRs. 
 
The EU's R&D Programmes 
It has not been the EU liberal policies but the EU dirigiste  policies which 
have directly benefited - even if in limited terms - the Portuguese under-developed 
telecommunications sector. There are conflicting views within the Commission and, as 
a result, contradictory policies have been developed. A more liberal sector argued for 
more liberalisation whilst a more dirigiste  one argued for further intervention mainly 
through R&D programmes. The ESPRIT and RACE programmes are the most visible 
face of the EU interventionist industrial policy but they had not been conceived to 
address the special needs of LFRs. The STAR programme and the subsequent 
Telematique programme are the sole relevant example of the trade-off between the 
Commission and LFRs for opening up their telecommunications market. 
                                                 
9Michalis, Maria, and Hills, Jill A New Regulatory Régime for European Telecommunications paper 
presented to the University Association for Contemporary European Studies 'After the Single Market: 
Services Regulation, Trade and Employment' London 3 March 1995 
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A general report to the Commission on the impact of the EU R&D 
programmes in Portugal from 1986 to 199110, pointed out that the most relevant 
Portuguese participation was through programmes having a direct link to economic 
matters. 50% of the participation is in the area of IT and industrial modernisation. In 
fact, only two programmes, amongst 37, had a Portuguese involvement of over 30 
contracts (BRITE-EURAM and ESPRIT). The Lisbon region accounted for more than 
72% of the national participation in EU R&D programmes. In addition to reinforcing 
the existing centralising trends, the EU R&D programmes are not believed to play any 
leading role. In nearly 80% of the cases European programmes are felt as reinforcing 
the normal activities of participating teams, especially in the fields of IT and 
telecommunications, exploitation of biological resources and exploitation of marine 
resources11. The financial impact of European R&D programmes in the relevant period 
was globally small (around 5% of gross expenditure in R&D) but locally very 
significant (around 40% of the research budget of participating teams)12. 
Accounting for only 5% of the gross expenditure in R&D, it cannot be 
assumed that EU programmes are making any structural difference in the research 
pattern of this member-state. As we are particularly concerned with 
telecommunications, we will now contemplate the EU programmes dealing specifically 
with this sector. ESPRIT, one of the most significant R&D programmes13, supports 
research projects in the fields of microelectronics, information processing systems and 
software, and as such it cannot be properly considered a telecommunications 
programme. So, it can be said that RACE is the only EU costly programme which dealt 
specifically with telecommunications. The objective of RACE was to generate R&D co-
operation among manufacturers, PTOs, and research institutions within Europe, and by 
doing so, to stimulate innovation and competitiveness in the European industry. The 
                                                 
10Caraça, J M G et al Study of the Impact of Community RTD Programmes on the Portuguese S&T 
Potential Junta Nacional de Investigação Científica e Tecnológica, Lisbon (1993) pp 15-24 
11Ibid pp 33 
12Ibid pp 53 
13The budget of the ESPRIT programme from 1987 to 1991 was 1,600 million ECU and from 1990 to 
1994 was 1,339. 
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ultimate goal of these efforts was the introduction of Integrated Broadband 
Communications (IBC) by 199514. The programme's budget was of 550 million ECU 
for the period between 1987 to 1991 and 484 million ECU for the period between 1990 
to 199415. 
Just like ESPRIT, the RACE programme had not been designed to address the 
needs of the LFRs in general nor the needs of Portugal in particular. In the 1980's these 
countries were still struggling with network expansion and with very low penetration 
rates. In Portugal, for example, in the late 1980's the penetration rate was about half of 
the European average. Hence, the introduction of broadband communications could not 
have been a priority. As shown in table 1 and table 2, only the core countries and the big 
manufacturers and PTOs have taken full advantage of the RACE programme. 
 
TABLE 1 
 
TABLE 2 
 
In fact, from the analysis of these tables, it is crystal-clear that the three largest 
EU countries (UK, Germany and France) are those which have benefited the most in 
terms of numbers of participations and in terms of project leadership. Even non-member 
states (Sweden, Finland and Austria joined the EU in January 1995) benefited more 
(Sweden) or almost as much as Portugal (Finland and Norway). Furthermore, there is no 
single Portuguese company among the 21 most involved in R&D projects. 
                                                 
14See e.g. Ungerer, Herbert, and Costello Telecommunications in Europe EC official publications, 
Luxembourg (1990) 
15Schnöring, Thomas 'European Telecommunications R&D Systems in Transition' in Steinfield, Charles 
et al (eds) Telecommunications in Transition Sage, Thousand Oaks (1994) 
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The Commission is not necessarily the true policy initiator and much of the 
EU actual policy often reflects competing national interests. In fact, the EU's most 
influential countries (Germany, France and the UK) have never been too concerned with 
the development of specific programmes for LFRs. LFRs themselves have not had the 
necessary weight to properly counterbalance the interests of core countries. Council 
negotiations - often behind closed doors - are therefore strenuous, and decisions are 
reached through various trade-offs, the so-called package deals. 
In these circumstances, it comes as no surprise that from the 1987 Green Paper 
to the CEC's 1992 Review on Telecommunications services16, there have been few 
mentions of the specific concerns of less developed and peripheral regions. 'Where they 
have appeared, they have been dealt with summarily and in little depth'17. In any case, 
some trade-offs were inevitable and STAR and later Telematique programmes were 
launched. STAR was approved in the October 1986 Council and was implemented from 
1987 to 1991 with EU financial aid of 780 million ECU (the EU contribution varied 
from 50% to 100%, according to type of project). The STAR's successor Telematique 
programme had a much smaller EU contribution - around 200 million ECU18. STAR 
and Telematique were Community Programmes run jointly by DGXIII and DGXVI, 
and in contrast to the research programmes, were financed by the European Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF). 
During the five-year period of STAR, it contributed approximately 2% of the 
total investment of the Telecommunications Operators (TOs) in the LFRs or the 
equivalent of what TOs are investing every two months. Since peripheral regions as a 
whole lag behind core regions by 10 years, by this yardstick a further 60 STAR 
programmes would be required to catch up (all other things being equal)19. In any case, 
                                                 
16Commission of the European Communities 1992 Review of the Situation in the Telecommunications 
Services Sector (Sec (92) 1048 final ) Brussels, (10 July 1992) 
17O Siochrú, Séan The EC's Telecommunications Policy and Less Favoured Regions: the Role of the 
STAR Programme paper delivered at the IAMCR Conference, Dublin (24-26 June 1993) 
18Ibid 
19Ibid 
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according to O Siochrú, even the most conservative estimates demonstrate the 
inadequacy of STAR to the task that telecommunications policy demanded of it20. 
Through the STAR programme, Portugal received EU financial assistance of 
around 120 million ECU21 which, considering for instance overall budgets of ESPRIT 
and RACE, is a very restrained amount. The financial limitations of the STAR 
programme for Portugal are recognised by the STAR National Commission which 
stated in the final report on the STAR programme that 'much more would have been 
done, had the EU contribution been higher'22. This recognition is quite significant since 
the STAR Commission produced a hyped analysis of the benefits of the STAR 
programme, considering it 'crucial to the creation of infrastructures needed to the 
introduction of advanced services'23. In fact, of the 2,234 short-listed national 
applications to the STAR programme, only 1,318 could be partly financed24. 
Although the STAR programme was clearly insufficient to deal with the 
specific needs of this LFR, it did have a positive impact on the expansion of the 
infrastructure and in the long overdue introduction of advanced services. Given that 
more than a thousand projects got financial support, the STAR programme has 
unequivocally speeded up the introduction of services such as mobile phone, videotex 
and videoconference. Table 3 presents the type and number of projects financed by 
STAR. 
 
TABLE 3 
 
                                                 
20Ibid 
21Comissão Nacional do Programa STAR Portugal, Programa STAR, Relatório Final de Execução 
Comissão Nacional do Programa STAR, Lisbon (April 1993) 
22Ibid 
23Ibid 
24Ibid 
CECS      Pág. 10 de 28 
Centro de Estudos de Comunicação e Sociedade      www.cecs.uminho.pt 
Helena Sousa   Telecommunications Reforms in  
   Portugal and the European Union 
Following STAR, another programme for telecommunications in LFRs was 
approved. The Telematique programme started being implemented in Portugal in 1992 
and is run by the National Commission for the STAR programme. According to the 
commission, the objective of this programme - subsequent to STAR -  is to develop 
advanced services, creating a national dynamic which would continue to favour the 
access and systematic usage of these services25. In practice, Telematique is no more 
than extra financing for the task initiated by STAR. The maximum amount from EU 
structural funds for this programme was around 34 million ECU26. The Telematique 
programme was still under way when the empirical research for this article was 
undertaken, so no final evaluation existed. In any case, the meagre amount of financial 
resources allocated to the programme suggests that it would not add substantially to 
what had already been done under STAR. 
Though recognising the inadequate nature of STAR and Telematique to 
implement the EU policy of economic and technological convergence, it is indisputable 
that in LFRs these programmes have created a great interest in advanced services 
provision. Indeed, as O Siochrú puts it, STAR funds created a class of advanced 
services entrepreneurs, actively seeking opportunities to develop services. It is even 
possible that at the present time there is more activity on the ground in the LFRs in 
these technologies than in core regions27. In Portugal, an indication of this interest is 
given by the number of projects submitted to these programmes. STAR and 
Telematique helped create the momentum for the introduction and development of 
advanced services.  
 
National Telecommunications Policies 
                                                 
25Comissão Nacional do Programa STAR Portugal,, Relatório Final de Execução do Programa 
Operacional Telematique Comissão Nacional do Programa STAR, Lisbon (March 1993) 
26Ibid 
27O Siochrú, Séan, op cit 
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When we refer to nationally-based policies, we do not mean that domestic 
policies are taken in isolation from the regional scene. Our meaning is that, although 
operating within the EU regulatory framework, Portugal still has room for manoeuvre in 
the decision-making process and in the implementation of policies. The EU framework 
is quite generalist and most of the recent telecommunications policies taken in Portugal 
cannot be explained by the regional setting. Even when national authorities are 
persuaded by the Commission's arguments and/or by the Council's package deals to 
move in a given direction - if no binding legislation already exists - the final 
responsibility for their actions falls on national government's hands. Yet, the separation 
between regional and national policies is still pressing because it was the government's 
own expressed policy to, first and foremost, defend the national interest and to maintain 
telecommunications in national hands28. 
The current telecommunications policy results partly from external sources 
(although it was ultimately Portugal which has conceded elements of its national 
sovereignty to the EU) and partly from a combination of nationally-based options. 
When Portugal joined the EC, the need to modernise and re-organise the 
telecommunications sector had already been recognised but the accession has 
intensified the pressure for change. On May 1986 - four months after the accession - 
Sequeira Braga, head of Secretaria de Estado dos Transportes e Comunicações (SETC) 
requested a study to examine Portuguese telecommunications and to report on the most 
pressing issues in this area. One year later, the Comissão para o Estudo do 
Desenvolvimento Institucional e Tecnológico das Comunicações (CEDITC) presented 
the study to the Ministério of Public Works, Transport and Communications. 
 In line with what was being discussed in the EC at the time, this study 
recommended the following sectorial changes: i) the regulatory body Instituto das 
Comunicações de Portugal (ICP) should initiate its activities; ii) a holding company 
                                                 
28See e.g. speeches delivered by the telecommunications ministro (secretary of state), Ferreira do Amaral, 
at the 4th and 5th APDC congresses in Lisbon. These speeches were published in Comunicações 
(January/February 1993) and Comunicações (January/February 1995), respectively. 
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should be set up to increase the efficiency of public operators; iii) postal and 
telecommunications services should be separated; iv) measures should be taken to 
prepare the opening up of telecommunications operators to private capital; v) more 
flexibility should be introduced in new telecommunications services; vi) prices should 
be liberalised in the non-basic telecommunications sub-sector29. These 
recommendations were largely adopted by the 11th Constitutional Government (1987-
1991) and constituted an important input to the 1989 Basic Telecommunications Law30. 
 
Opening up the Market to Competition 
Amongst the CEDITC recommendations, the first to be implemented was the 
separation of the regulatory and operational functions. The ICP gained effective legal 
existence through the law decree 283/89 of 23 August 198931. This piece of legislation 
supposedly created an environment which would allow an even-handed introduction of 
competition in telecommunications services. The EU and indeed other pro-competition 
international actors had been arguing that the dual regulatory and commercial function 
of the telecommunications operator could not be sustained in a new competitive 
environment because of the conflict of interests. Although these arguments were 
accepted and ICP was set up before the directive on competition in the markets for 
telecommunications services32, no real autonomy was granted by the Portuguese 
government to the regulatory institute. 
According to the law decree 283/89, ICP has a vast array of responsibilities to 
perform, namely to actively contribute to the sector's legal framework; to provide 
assistance to the government for the purposes of carrying out its tutelage 
                                                 
29Ministério das Obras Públicas, Transportes e Comunicações Desenvolvimento Institucional e 
Tecnológico das Comunicações MOPTC, Lisbon (1987) 
30Law nº88/89 of 11 September 
31The ICP was formally created in 1981 under the law decree 181/81 of 2nd of July but this legislation 
has not produced any results until the 1989 go ahead. 
32In addition to the opening up of the telecommunications services, this directive (90/388/EEC of 28 June 
1990) also contemplates the separation of regulatory and commercial functions. 
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responsibilities; to co-ordinate, on a national level, all matters concerning the carrying 
out of treaties, conventions and international agreements; to approve materials and 
equipment, to undertake the management of the radio electric spectrum; to license 
public sector communications operators in addition to providers of value added 
services; among others. The difficulty however is that, with the exception of technical 
matters, the ICP has merely an advisory/supportive role. No line has been clearly drawn 
between what is a policy and a regulatory issue. Furthermore, the members of the board 
of directors are appointed by a resolution of the Council of Ministers. So, even with its 
legally recognised administrative and financial autonomy33 and despite feasible strains, 
the ICP cannot be said to be a truly independent body.  
Immediately after the legal setting up of ICP, the Basic Law on the 
establishment, management and exploitation of telecommunications infrastructures and 
services (88/89 of 11 September 1989) was approved by the National Assembly. This 
Telecommunications Act can be understood as a real watershed in the Portuguese 
telecommunications legal history because, for the first time, the general principles for 
the sector were compiled in the same piece of legislation. According to this law, it is the 
responsibility of the state to guarantee the existence and availability of fundamental 
services, including fixed telephone services, telex and a switched data transmission 
service. However, the exploitation of services involving the use of complementary 
telecommunications infrastructures may be carried out by public and private companies, 
once properly licensed. 
Similarly, the provision of value added services may be made by any singular 
person or collective body (under specific conditions) and by the public 
telecommunications carriers and complementary telecommunications companies. To 
sum up, apart from the fundamental services, which would continue to be provided by 
the state, other actors - either private or public - could from then on apply to become 
                                                 
33 The ICP has to generate its own financial resources which is achieved mainly from the spectrum 
management (spectrum users pay ICP directly) and from the issuing of licenses. 
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services providers. Only the telecommunications infrastructure was to remain firmly 
under the responsibility of the public telecommunications carrier. 
Although new entrants would have to comply with specific rules and 
regulations, the Telecommunications Act sets out some requirements concerning 
protection of competition. It states that public telecommunications carriers should 
guarantee the use of their networks for all communications carriers under equal 
competitive conditions. When public carriers provide complementary services they are 
equally forbidden to use any practice which may distort conditions of competitiveness 
or which are considered to be an abuse of a leading position. These legal provisions 
have not prevented alleged abuses of dominant position and accusations of unfair 
competition have been frequently reported. 
These legal instruments - notwithstanding their significance - were not 
particularly controversial as the changes were perceived both as necessary and 
inevitable by both the government and the opposition main party, the Socialist Party. In 
general terms, it can be argued that the creation of ICP and the liberalisation of value-
added services were directly and indirectly related to the EU legal framework. If 
Portugal had not passed this legislation, it would have had to comply later on with the 
ONP Council directive34, with the Services directive35 and subsequent legislation. 
Even if these changes were ultimately introduced by the national parliament 
and/or government, it is quite clear that the EU played a role here. For ideological, 
political and economic reasons, the EU persuasively convinced the member states that 
no alternative existed but to open up their markets. Core countries had very concrete 
interests in doing so whilst peripheral countries were convinced that they had not much 
to lose. So, the Council ended up approving legislation that would make it more 
difficult for member-states to take protectionist measures. 
                                                 
34Council of the European Communities Council Directive of 28 June 1990 on the Establishment of the 
Internal Market for Telecommunications Services through the Implementation of Open Network 
Provision (90/387/EEC; OJ L 192/1, 24.07.90) 
35Council of the European Communities, 90/388/EEC, op cit 
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The Re-organisation of the Sector 
In addition to the opening up of the telecommunications market to new 
entrants, the Portuguese authorities believed that the three traditional public operators 
(Correios e Telecomunicações de Portugal, CTT; Telefones de Lisboa e Porto, TLP and 
Marconi36) had to go through a re-organisation process. These operators were - for 
historical reasons - organised on a geographical basis37 which was considered by the 
government as inappropriate. So, a financial holding society, Comunicações Nacionais 
(CN) was set up on 199238 mainly to co-ordinate the sector, to define 
investment/business strategies and to deal with the privatisation process. CN started its 
operations in early 1993 comprising five independent public companies: the former 
postal services of CTT, now an independent company (also called CTT), Telecom 
Portugal  (TP), the telecommunications arm of the earlier CTT, Teledifusora de 
Portugal  (TDP)39, TLP and Marconi. 
The creation of CN was defended by its chairperson, Cabral da Fonseca, as 
being the 'rational' choice for the sector. The two other alternatives were to maintain the 
historical scenario or to merge the companies, but the holding company was - according 
to him - the only solution with small disadvantages40. This view, however, would not be 
maintained for long as Telecom Portugal would soon put in place its strategy to become 
the dominant actor in the Portuguese telecommunications scene. The president of 
Telecom Portugal from 1990 to 1992, Gonçalo Areia, had already publicly argued for 
the setting up of a single telecommunications operator41. But it would be the next 
                                                 
36Marconi was considered a public operator but 49% of its shares were in private hands. 
37CTT used to supply local telephony to the entire country with the exception of the two main cities, 
Lisbon and Oporto, and long distance communications to Europe and North Africa; TLP used to cover 
Lisbon and Oporto while Marconi had the monopoly of cable and satellite communications to the rest of 
the world 
38Law decree 88/92 of 14 April 1992 
39TDP was set up through law decree 138/91 of 8 April 1991 in order to distribute broadcasting signals 
for RTP and for the forthcoming television companies. 
40See Público, 9 December 1992 
41Expresso, 19 December 1992: Economia 
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president, Luís Todo Bom, (also vice-president of the Social Democrat Party) who 
would convince CN and the social democrat government that the company he chaired 
was the only one that could adequately lead the re-organisation process. The plan was to 
take over TDP, TLP and Marconi. 
Fierce resistance towards what was then called the TP's 'secret plan', soon 
broke out. The Marconi's president, Sequeira Braga, and the TLP's president, Mello 
Franco, strongly opposed the idea as they wanted the identity of their companies 
preserved. Amongst other criticisms, these two operators argued 1) that the re-
organisation process would be very expensive, 2) that a mega-company would be too 
expensive for national investors in the forthcoming privatisation, 3) that Marconi 
already has private capital which would complicate even further the process, 4) that lay 
offs would be inevitable if a merger occurred and 5) that each company had its own 
organisational culture42. 
Marconi was, by far, the company which tried hardest to avoid the take over. 
In addition to intense lobbying, the company tried to position itself in such a way that 
would make it very difficult for it to be absorbed by PT. Marconi expanded into new 
markets and services and strengthened its position into the international 
communications market. A strategic alliance (Atlantic Alliance) was established with 
the Brazilian long distance telecommunications operator, Embratel, to provide global 
telecommunications services and to promote joint investment abroad. The company's 
position in the Chinese market was also built up with the signing of a co-operation and 
development agreement in the field of telecommunications with the Chinese authorities. 
At the same time, a satellite communications company was set up in Macau, in 
association with local companies from Macau and the People's Republic of China. Also, 
in 1994, the company was awarded several paging contracts in the Indian market and 
                                                 
42Expresso, 23 October 1993:C2 
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acquired a stake in a satellite communications company in Hungary43. Marconi was then 
operating in more than 15 countries, solidifying its image both externally and internally. 
The predecessor of the ministro Ferreira do Amaral, Oliveira Martins, also 
argued against the TP's/government merger strategy, considering it 'absurd'. Whilst in 
other public service companies, the government talks about liberalisation of 
monopolies, in the telecommunications sector, the governments wants to 'integrate 
everything in a monster which will have more than 20,000 employees and where 
everything will be mixed up'44. In 1987, when Oliveira Martins was ministro and 
Sequeira Braga was secretário de estado, the government's strategy was to preserve the 
companies' identity and to grant administrative autonomy to CTT and TLP. In fact, 'the 
big the better' strategy was severely criticised and strongly opposed but Luís Todo Bom 
had already convinced the ministro Ferreira do Amaral and his close ally, Cabral da 
Fonseca, chairperson of CN, that concentration was the best solution for the Portuguese 
telecommunications sector. 
So, despite Marconi's full thrust strategy and fierce criticisms from the 
government's own ranks, the merger went ahead. On the 20th of November 1993, in a 
long interview to Expresso newspaper, Cabral da Fonseca, argued that more than one 
company providing basic services in a country with ten million inhabitants and with the 
Portuguese GDP was unthinkable: 'there is no way of surviving in a competitive 
environment'. The CN's president previously believed that Portugal should have two 
basic service operators, one international (possibly the historic Marconi) and one 
national (possibly a new company resulting from the merger between TP and TLP)45. 
No clear case was put forward to defend his new point of view but it became quite clear 
whose lobbying was more efficient. Interestingly enough, Luís Todo Bom has also 
never put forward a clear set of arguments to justify publicly why - in a country which 
has traditionally had three operators - a single PTT would provide a better service. He 
                                                 
43Marconi Annual Report 1993 Marconi Global Communications, Lisbon (1994) 
44Quoted in Expresso, 19 March 1994; see also interview to O Independente, 9 December 1994 
45See Público, 10 September 1993 and Público 30 October 1993 
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has argued, in very general terms, that Portugal should follow the Dutch model which is 
based on a single PTT and, furthermore, that the creation of a single 
telecommunications operation was essential to fight foreign competition when the 
market is fully liberalised between 1998 and 200346. 
In early 1994, this most controversial issue was settled, and contrary to 
previous decisions, the first phase of the merger operation did occur. A new company, 
Portugal Telecom (PT) was finally set up47. PT resulted from the merger of TP, TLP 
and TDP. The financial holding company, CN, would go on supervising the new PT, 
Marconi and CTT. CTT's postal services were never meant to be part of PT but Marconi 
would not remain independent for long. However, the incorporation of Marconi brought 
up more complex issues. Whilst TLP and TDP had a relatively small dimension, 100% 
of their capital was public and no international links had been established, Marconi had 
49% of its capital in private hands, had well established international links and alliances 
and its concession contract would only be over by 2001. 
 Marconi's integration had already been decided but it was only in April 1995 
that CN transferred 51% of Marconi's state owned shares to Portugal Telecom. PT 
became then Marconi's biggest shareholder and, once it controlled the company, it was 
not hard to get Marconi's small shareholders to exchange their shares for PT ones. The 
exchange of shares was done during the first stage of PT's privatisation, in May 1995, 
when PT managed to gain control over more than 90% of Marconi's capital48. With 
Marconi's actual integration, Portugal had for the first time what European countries 
used to have in the past: all basic telecommunications services under the umbrella of a 
single operator. 
Neither the government nor the operator which has benefited the most from 
the re-organisation (PT) have been able to justify the paradox of arguing simultaneously 
                                                 
46Público, 10 September 1993 
47Law decree 122/94 of 14 May 1994 
48Diário de Notícias, 30 May 1995 
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for liberalisation and for concentration. On the one hand, it has been argued that 
liberalisation and full competition can only benefit the consumer; on the other hand, it 
has been argued that only a big operator can respond to the challenges imposed by 
liberalisation. In any case, because the re-organisation process was designed behind 
closed doors with no public debate and adequate consideration for long standing actors 
in the field, there was no need to prepare a consistent case. The process was conducted 
with speed but it certainly lacked participation. 
  
The Privatisation of Portugal Telecom 
Just as with the re-organisation of the sector, the partial privatisation of 
Portugal Telecom is not a direct result of EU policies. According to O Siochrú, the only 
acknowledged problem the EU has expressed about LFRs concerned where they would 
find the resources to 'keep pace' with liberalisation - 'and indeed this may be no more 
than a veiled reference to privatisation'49. But, even if the EU has tried to convince its 
members to privatise, it has no open policy on the issue and member states can decide 
their own strategies. Portugal has decided to follow the North American/European 
bandwagon. 
The ministro  Ferreira do Amaral  has publicly stated that - whether we want it 
or not - the telecommunications sector will be exclusively private because public 
companies have no agility nor vocation to stand a chance in a competitive market. 'This 
is happening in all countries in the world. I do not know any [country] which is, at this 
stage, thinking about nationalising the telecommunications sector and the vast majority 
is thinking about privatising'50. From this speech, two features emerge: i) if most 
countries are privatising, Portugal must do it as well, ii) even if Portugal resists 
privatisation, it would happen anyway. Yet, Ferreira do Amaral has not attempted to 
                                                 
49O Siochrú (1993) op cit 
50Speech delivered at the APDC conference in Lisbon, November 1994 
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explain the benefits of privatisation and he has not attempted to explain why public 
companies (whose managers have been appointed by the social democrats over the last 
decade) have performed poorly. The telecommunications sector in the country was in 
private hands since the 19th century up until the 1960's, and in the public sector ever 
since. In both periods it has performed deficiently. The arguments for less state 
intervention in the economy and the subsequent privatisation of PT were legitimised on 
an ideological basis as no evidence of its benefits is provided. 
Apart from these general considerations about the benefits of privatisation, the 
government had indeed very concrete reasons to push for it. Both CTT and PT had huge 
financial deficits in their pensions funds because part of these resources had been used 
to invest in the sector. The combined deficit of CTT and PT funds was estimated by 
Cabral da Fonseca between £560 million and £1,120 million51. Commissioned by CN, 
the British company, Bacon & Woodrow, calculated that - although part of the removed 
money had already been paid back - there was still £800 million missing52. The 
privatisation of PT was certainly an easy way of replacing the money which should not 
have been so readily removed from the pension funds in the first place. Furthermore, the 
ministério of  Finances was urging privatisation in the expectation that it could generate 
extra funds. In a pre-electoral period, raising taxes was unthinkable but the government 
had to cope with increasing national demands and with the requirement of co-financing 
EU projects for the country. 
The timing for privatisation was not accidental either. The government wanted 
to initiate privatisation before other continental operators (e.g. Telecom Italia, 
Telefonica, Deutsche Telekom, France Telecom, etc.). There was an understanding that 
if it was not done before their privatisation, their would be insufficient demand and 
Portugal would have serious difficulties in selling PT shares. Additionally, it had to be 
done before the legislative elections of October 1995 because, in this legislature, no 
                                                 
51Expresso, 19 April 1994 
52Expresso, 14 May 1994; see also Público, 15 August 1994 
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robust opposition to privatisation existed and also because, when the government 
presented its telecommunications achievements to the electorate, the privatisation start 
up would seemingly 'complete' previous reforms. 
On the 20th of March 1995, just before the privatisation went ahead, the 
government granted PT a public service concession contract for 30 years (due for 
renewal in 15 years). According to this contract53, PT has the exclusive right to provide 
basic telecommunications services and to manage all telecommunications 
infrastructures which support these services. So, when the company was put on the 
market, it had a solid contract granting it the monopoly of most telecommunications 
services in the country. But the public service contract had little impact and it has not 
diminished criticism about the way the process was conducted. The government was 
particularly criticised because of PT's privatisation timing and valuation. Several 
Portuguese actors involved in the telecommunications sector argued that privatisation 
should be done after - and not before - wider liberalisation was brought to the sector54. 
Amongst other actors, the telecommunications platform55, representing the interests of 
four private telecommunications companies, argued that privatisation at that particular 
stage served foreign interests rather than national and believed that the current policy 
would asphyxiate embryonic private telecommunications companies56.  
The valuation of the company was especially controversial because the overall 
value of the company declined dramatically in a short period of time. In August 1994, 
the consultant firm, James Capel Europe, estimated PT's value as £4,000 million57. Luís 
Todo Bom, in an interview to Expresso, denied press reports that PT was being poorly 
evaluated and stated categorically that the company was worth between £3,200 million 
                                                 
53See law decree 40/95 of 15 February 1995 
54Before the partial privatisation of PT, only 3% of the telecommunications market was in the private 
sector (see Diário de Notícias, 19 November 1994) 
55In Portuguese, it is called Plataforma para a Modernização das Telecomunicações  
56See e.g. Diário de Notícias, 18 November 1994; Telecomunicações, nº9 January 1995 
57Diário de Notícias, 6 August 1994 
CECS      Pág. 22 de 28 
Centro de Estudos de Comunicação e Sociedade      www.cecs.uminho.pt 
Helena Sousa   Telecommunications Reforms in  
   Portugal and the European Union 
and £4,000 million58. The ESSI group - commissioned by the government to co-ordinate 
the privatisation process - estimated, in early 1995, that PT's value was 40% less than 
that James Capel had calculated the year before. Finally, PT was put on the market at a 
price which would vary between 1,900 million and 2,356 million59. Whatever the 
specific pressures put on the Portuguese government to lower PT's value, it can be 
assumed that the government feared that there would not be demand for PT's shares if 
the price was not particularly low. As such, the demand was enormous and the 
operation was perceived as a success60. In any case, the government was not prepared to 
take risks - either stopping or postponing the operation - when the October 1995 
legislative elections were just around the corner. 
So, the partial privatisation went ahead with around 50 million shares on the 
market. PT offered 23 million shares for direct sale to Portuguese and international 
investors and 27 million shares at a special session of the Lisbon stock exchange on the 
1st of June. The 27 million included 17 million for shareholders in Marconi, 7,5 million 
for PT employees, small investors and emigrants, 1,5 million for PT's bondholders and 
one million for other shareholders61.  Demand for shares in the direct sale of PT has 
outstripped supply fourfold. International and national investors have submitted offers 
for more than 80 million shares although only 23 million were made available.  
From the overall 28% of PT's capital which was put on the market, 2,7% went 
to the hands of the Espírito Santo group which comprises the ESSI bank. The rest is 
highly dispersed amongst national and international small investors, pension funds and 
companies62. The operation cashed in £560 million, from which the state kept £20 
million for the Treasury. £320 million went to the CTT/PT pension funds, £19 million 
went to the consortium - lead by Sociedade Financeira de Corretagem, part of the ESSI 
                                                 
583 December 1994 
59O Independente, 26 May 1995 
60See, inter alia, Diário de Notícias, 2 July 1995 
61Comunicações Nacionais et al Prospect prepared for the Privatisation of Portugal Telecom Lisbon 
(1995) 
62Público, 4 July 1995 
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bank - which co-ordinated the privatising operation. The remaining £200 million 
corresponded to Marconi's shares exchanged for PT's63. More than 90% of Marconi's 
shares in private hands were exchanged for PT shares at a previously agreed price (£26 
per share) which guaranteed the total integration of Marconi in PT. 
Possibly it will be the second phase of the PT's privatisation - expected to take 
place in June 1996 - that will prove to be crucial to the company's future. At that 
particular stage, the government and PT will probably seize the opportunity to establish 
an international alliance that will improve PT's business opportunities in the 
international market. The government has dismissed the need to find a strategic partner 
in the second stage of privatisation when 21% to 22% of the capital will be sold64 
(according to the law, no more than 49% can be in private hands). But if powerful 
actors - in the international scene and within PT - have a specific interest in a given 
alliance, it is most likely that it will be secured. 
After the first stage of PT's privatisation, on the 13th of July 1995, the Council 
of Ministers approved the abolition of Comunicações Nacionais. CN had been co-
ordinating the restructuring of the sector and preparing the privatisation of PT. Still, CN 
had not been able to actually lead the process and was too weak to fight lobbies and 
balance the needs and interests of the various actors involved in national 
telecommunications. Ferreira do Amaral, quoted in Público newspaper, argued that CN 
would come to an end because it has accomplished its mission65. Furthermore, Cabral 
da Fonseca stated that he would calmly assist the evolution of the sector because 'the 
essential had already been done and it is irreversible'66. 
 
Conclusions  
                                                 
63Diário de Notícias, 2 June 1995 
64Expresso, 3 July 1995 
6514 July 1995 
66Público, 14 July 1995 
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Over the past decade, significant telecommunications reforms were introduced 
in Portugal. The market was opened up: terminal equipment and advanced services were 
liberalised; the separation of the regulatory and operational functions became effective; 
postal and telecommunications services were split up; the telecommunications sector 
underwent a major re-restructuring which involved the merger of the three main public 
telecommunications operators and, finally, the partial privatisation of the main operator, 
Portugal Telecom, has started and will probably be finalised by 1996. 
Some of these reforms, namely the opening up of the markets, were introduced 
because the country had to comply or would have to comply in the near future with the 
EU legislation. Other aspects of the Portuguese reform relating to the re-organisation of 
the sector and to the privatisation of Portugal Telecom have no direct relation to the EU 
legal framework. The re-organisation of the sector was designed and implemented by 
the national government and the lobbying process was also internally-based. Likewise, 
the privatisation of PT has taken place for very concrete domestic reasons. Capital was 
urgently needed to finance major investments in network expansion and in advanced 
services, so pension funds from public companies were used and the partial privatisation 
of PT was perceived as the easiest way of paying the money back. The Treasury was 
also keen on the privatisation, hoping to be able to generate extra funds. 
So, although most of the policy decisions adopted in Portugal are in accordance 
with the EU policy framework, it does not necessarily mean that i) they were imposed 
by the Union and ii) that they were in contradiction with the government's interests. For 
example, the government wanted to protect PT's interests and it has taken the necessary 
steps to do so. In spite of the liberalisation of value added services, PT's position in the 
market was strengthened. The company was the clear winner of the merger process; it 
has continued to be the sole provider of basic services and it has also been allowed to 
provide a wide range of advanced services, including cable television.  
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In any case, Portugal has so far complied with the EU binding legislation and 
policy orientations, even if it has not fully benefited from the most relevant aspects of 
the EU telecommunications policy, namely the opening up of the markets and R&D 
subsidies. The Commission itself recognises that it is relatively easy to assess the 
benefits of the EU telecommunications policy for more industrialised countries, but that 
it all becomes rather more complicated if one attempts to evaluate the benefits for 
countries like Portugal. Precisely because of the recognition that the EU policy does not 
specifically address the needs of LFRs, the Commission put forward programmes such 
as STAR and Telematique expecting to persuade LFRs that they had not been forgotten. 
Despite the meagre resources allocated to these programmes, they had a positive impact 
on Portuguese telecommunications: they supported the expansion of the network and 
they assisted in the introduction and development of advanced services such as ISDN, 
mobile phone, paging and videoconference. 
So, it can be argued that there is a level of interdependency between the EU 
and Portugal in this field. Portugal might not have benefited from the most important 
aspects of the EU policy but has taken advantage of STAR and Telematique 
programmes to boost the development of national telecommunications. From the EU 
point of view, the opening up of the Portuguese market was perceived as relevant not 
only because it meant more business for core countries' industries but  also because it 
was necessary to foster economic and political integration in this area. This 
interdependent relationship could have been more equitable if Portugal had not joined 
the EEC so late and if the country had not been isolated for so long. In fact, Portugal 
lacked experience in the international fora and was clearly ill-prepared to effectively 
negotiate for further concessions out of Europe in this particular field. Portugal has, for 
example, agreed to open up its telecommunications markets before the EU directives 
were adopted which put the country in a weak negotiating position. Had national 
political and technical elites had superior bargaining skills, a more even-handed 
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relationship could have been established between Portugal and the EU in the 
telecommunications sector. 
 
 
Table 1: Participation of European Countries in RACE 
Country 
 
Participation Project Leadership 
United Kingdom 148 23 
Germany 146 27 
France  144 10 
Italy 60 7 
Spain 57 1 
Netherlands 49 5 
Sweden 39 2 
Belgium 37 7 
Greece 35 1 
Denmark 34 2 
Ireland 23 3 
Portugal 23 2 
Finland 17 1 
Norway 14 - 
Switzerland 12 1 
Austria 4 - 
Total 842 92 
Source: Schröring, T 'European Telecommunications R&D Systems in Transition' in 
Steinfield, Charles et al (eds) Telecommunications in Transition Sage, Thousand Oaks 
(1994) 
 
Table 2: Participation of Organisations and Companies in RACE 
Companies Participation Project Leader 
 
Alcatel 70 15 
Philips 30 4 
British Telecom 29 6 
SwedischTelecom 25 1 
Thomson 23 3 
Telefonica 21 - 
Netherlands PTT 20 - 
France Télécom 20 - 
Ericsson 19 3 
DBP Telekom 17 4 
Bosh Telecom 15 1 
GEC 15 - 
Siemens 14 1 
STC 13 3 
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Plessey 11 3 
Telecom Eireann 10 3 
Kjobenhavns Telefon 10 - 
AT&T-NSI 10 - 
IBM 10 1 
Mafra 10 1 
Source: Schröring, op cit (table 1) 
 
 
 
Table 3: Portuguese Projects Financed by STAR 
Type of Operation 
 
Number of Projects 
Infrastructures  
ISDN 36 
Mobile Telephone 7 
Paging  5 
Videoconference 5 
Videotex 5 
Text/Message Service (MHS/EDI) 1 
Packet Switched Network/DACS 8 
Incentives to offer and demand in 
advanced services 
 
Studies 8 
Demonstrations 44 
Incentives 1,148 
Creation of Regional Services 2 
Total 1,269 
Source: adapted from Comissão Nacional do Programa STAR Portugal, Programa 
STAR, Relatório Final de Execução Comissão Nacional do Programa STAR, Lisbon 
(April 1993) 
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